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game played in Mondee Gills is not so familiar
because of the isolation of the country and pecu-
liarities of the dialect of the Mondees. Many people
confuse the game with its rogue variant sometimes played
for money with thimbleriggers on the streets of big cities.
Mainland historians trace the roots to primitive contests such
as coin tossing and matching pennies. However, every
Mondee knows that the game is as old as their land, and the
land is really old. An ancient tomb unearthed by archaeol-
ogists on the western side of Capra Heuvel, the second-
highest hill in the country, was found to contain the remains
of domesticated cave goats and knucklebones, which
supports the hypothesis that the basics of the game go back
to farmers of the late Neolithic Revolution.
The rules of the Mondee Gills Game (MGG) were always
the same, although the scenery changed with time. Nowa-
days the Mondee Gills Monday TV broadcasts the game as
an open-air reality show in which there are three caves, one
goat, and two traditional characters called Monte and Con-
nie. The goat is hidden by Monte in one of the caves before
the show starts, two other caves are left empty. The second
actor, Connie, who is randomly chosen from the audience, is
ignorant of what the caves conceal, and will be offered two
tries to find the goat. She is asked first to choose one of three
caves. Then Monte always proceeds to reveal an empty cave –
one of the caves not chosen by Connie – and asks whether
she wants to stay with her initial choice or switch the choice
to the other remaining unrevealed cave. The goat is won if
the final choice is correct.
Most visitors from nearby Laieland who are new to the
game, when playing in the role of Connie, are keen on
making the first choice at random, but they rarely realize the
true meaning of the switch offer when two unrevealed caves
remain. Many of them think that once the first choice is
equally likely to fall on the cave with the goat, the equality of
chances still persists when one empty cave is excluded, so
the odds are 1:1 whichever the action. Some of them are
reluctant to switch and prefer to stick with the first chosen
cave. Others, more experienced in primitive games, flip a fair
coin to decide on the second choice. The newbies quickly
notice that the coin-flippers win about a half of the goats in
the rounds played, whereas those who stay with the initial
choice score only one third.
Needless to say, native Connies are superior in the game,
managing to win about two thirds of the goats in the rounds
played by switching all the time. The advantage of the Mon-
dees, whose strategy also involves choosing the first cave
uniformly at random, is due to the local educators, who
developed composite teaching programs. Training starts in
early childhood with a chocolate goat concealed in one of
To switch or not to switch, that is the question . . .
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three bags, but it is problematic at this stage, as the kids cry
when they are not given the bag they initially chose or when
they are not rewarded. Later on, children practice Mondee
Karlo techniques using educational computers and playing
the MGG for valuable coins with goat heads and tails, either
against cartoon Monte applets or by distributing the roles over
two groups of players. Students of secondary schools are
dedicated to the history and philosophy of the MGG [17] and
have theoretical lessons on the fundamentals of the Doctrine of
Chances [2].
The theory of the MGG is a subject by itself, being largely
focused on the problems of utility of switch and the resolu-
tion of the paradox of odds. Basic propositions are found in
Books of Texts [1, 5, 15, 19]. The reader is referred to the
works of Magister [6, 7, 8] for the up-to-date, critical analysis
of the major theoretical developments. A rich source for
those who have a good command of Mondees language is
Quickygnosis [21], the online forum of the Mondee Gills
educators. In this essay we shall mention only some theories
that will be important for seeing the place of our contribu-
tion.The names of the two principal schools of thought can
be translated from Mondees as Big-Endians and Little-
Endians.
The traditional school of Big-Endians, also known as
simplists, originates from prophet Prosto, who taught that
paradoxes should be resolved from the convenient end.
Having postulated that the first choice gives the goat with
probability 1/3, Big-Endians prove that the never-switching
strategy wins with this very probability 1/3, and the always-
switching strategy wins with probability 2/3 – because the
revealed cave is empty, the goat is found either in the cave
first chosen or in another one unrevealed. From this they
conclude, quite convincingly, that the odds for the second
choice cannot be 1:1 with certainty, since always-switching
wins with probability strictly higher than 1/2. As a further
justification of the advantage of the always-switching
strategy, a metaphysical experiment is conducted in which
Connie’s personality at the moment of the first choice
dissociates in two, of which Jekyll-Connie sticks with the
first choice, whereas Hyde-Connie switches. A newest
branch of the school goes farther to assert that the odds of
the second choice do not exist unless it is explicitly spec-
ified what kind of random device Monte is using when the
first Connie’s choice was correct and he is free to decide
which of two empty caves he is going to reveal. Despite the
internal split, all Big-Endians consider the paradox of odds
completely resolved by these arguments, and the utility of
switch justified.
Formerly, everyone accepted the simplistic views, but, a
few generations in the past, the princess of Mondee Gills had
bad luck in playing the game. The legend narrates that she
chose cave 1, and when Monte opened cave 3 she switched
to cave 2, whereas the golden goat was hidden in cave 1. To
console the princess, the duke, a devoted friend of the ruling
house, passed a law to increase the number of caves from 3 to
1000. But on the next Monday the princess lost again by
switching to cave 2 after all caves numbered from 3 to 1000
had been revealed as empty. Based on conclusions of the
investigation commissioned by the duke, the High Court
accused Monte of fraud, and Monte, who was in fact the
minister of education, was fired. Later studies showed that
the minister was right when he murmured that such misfor-
tune is not unlikely to occur to some Connies, given the fact
that the MGG is played every Monday, but this theme will
lead us away from our main topic. . . The ruler at that time,
father of the princess, overruled the duke’s law and issued a
decree commanding all to stick with tradition by playing
exclusively with 3 caves, and for the host to flip a fair coin for
revealingoneof twoempty caveswhenConnie’s first guess is
correct. The decree called into life the Little-Endian school of
conditionalistic thinking. The wisdom of the ruler enabled
the scholars to define the odds for Connie’s second choice
with perfect mathematical rigor and eventually to justify the
advantage of switching by evaluating the odds in its favor at
2:1 in the particularly important case when cave 1 was cho-
sen by a random pick and cave 3 revealed. More advanced
modern methods showed that under this mode of play, the
result 2:1 also holds for other selections of two distinct cave
numbers.
The schools of Big-Endians and Little-Endians are in a
state of constant controversy, each accusing the other of
resolving the odds paradox from the wrong end. The Little-
Endians claim that their opponents do not provide enough
evidence that switching is a better action for Connie after she
has chosen cave 1 and cave 3 has been revealed. The dif-
ferences have grown so large as to threaten the country’s
educational activities, leading the High Court to ban some of
the most offensive scholars from Quickygnosis to cool down
the mood [22].
One insightful, unorthodox offspring of the Little-Endian
paradigm is the Monte Crawl game [18], in which Monte
always crawls to reveal the cave with smaller number from
the two caves unchosen by Connie, when her initial choice
happens to be correct. Under this mode of play, Connie
receives a definite signal about the location of the goat when
Monte is forced to go to the cave with the larger number,
because when he cannot reveal the cave with the smaller
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second guess, the odds in favor of switching are no longer
constant, as with the fair-coin-flipping Monte, rather they
stay 1:1 if the cave with smaller number is revealed, but 1:0 if
the cave with larger number is revealed. A dual regime is the
Monte Haul game, in which Monte is always hauled to the
cave with higher number to reveal it when Connie’s initial
choice happens to be correct, the odds being 1:0 and 1:1,
respectively. These instances of Monte’s behavior are
important for seeing that the odds can be 1:1 in some situa-
tions, but under no circumstances do the odds strictly favor
sticking with the initial choice, provided that the initial guess
is correctwithprobability 1/3 (and assuming that theodds for
the second choice are well defined).
One subtle distinction between twomajor theories, which
is rarely stated explicitly, is that the Big-Endianness only
admits two of Connie behaviors, which may be called con-
stant-action strategies: always switch, or always stick. The
Big-Endian solution states the superiority of always-switch-
ing over always-sticking by the same initial choice of the
cave. In contrast to that, the Little-Endianness admits
dependence of the last Connie action on what happened so
far, thus allowing for mixed-action (or history-dependent)
strategies - perhaps sometimes switch and sometimes not;
the task of the theory amounts then to showing that always
switching is optimal within the larger class of strategies.
In this connection we should warn the reader against
possible misinterpretations of the name of our principal
character. The name Connie should not be associated with
‘‘contestant’’, rather it stems from Constance, meaning the
actor winning by playing constant-action, always-switching
strategies.
A major actual breakthough in the odds paradox is found
in the newest writings of Magister [8], where the Little-Endian
solution is derived from the Big-Endian with the aid of the
principles of symmetry. The present article is devoted to
another line of Magister’s thought in the direction of viewing
MGG as a game of strategy, that is, a situation in which two
actors interact to achieve their goals within the framework
specified by the rules of the game. We credit Professor [5] for
the evaluation of Connie’s winning probability in the worst
case as being 2/3, and for identifying whcih of Monte’s
strategies is most unfavourable for her, namely, his rolling a
symmetric three-sided die to determine the goat’s hiding
place. This key result and its simple proofs are ranked by
Magister [9] as the Holy Grail of the MGG studies, not to say
that it sets objective limits to the long-run proportion of goats
won from a hostile Monte willing to keep as many goats as
possible.
Middle-Endianness: A Simplistic Path
The approach we take here may be called Middle-Endian-
ness, because it is equidistant from the two mainstreams, and
it circumvents the probabilistic postulates in the problem of
the utility of switching. The new doctrine is an instance of the
fundamental principle of eliminating dominated strategies;
in simplistic terms it can be stated as follows: No matter
where Monte hides the goat and how he plays when he
can choose between two caves to reveal, each Connie
strategy ‘‘choose cave Y and stay with it’’ is outperformed
by a strategy ‘‘choose cave Y 0 = Y, then switch’’. We
believe that this mode of thinking has the potential to
provide a convincing explanation of the advantage of
the switching action to the people from Laieland, as com-
pared with more sophisticated Big-Endian/Little-Endian and
other methods based on computing probabilities. Once
Laiemen adopt strategic thinking and realize that there is a
two-step action, the comparison of alternatives becomes
obvious and, moreover, free of any probability
considerations.
To conceive the twist in the switch-versus-notswitch
dilemma we stay in this introduction with the simplistic
scenario, that is, ignore which particular cave is revealed by
Monte in the case of an initial correct guess. Let X denote the
cave hiding the goat. Consider the following three strategies
for Connie:
A: choose cave 1, do not switch,
B: choose cave 1, then switch,
C: choose cave 2, then switch.
Strategy A wins if X = 1, whereas strategy B wins if X 2
f2; 3g; so the strategies A and B cannot win simultaneously.
The odds are 1:2 against A if the values of X are assumed to be
equally likely. More generally, the extended Big-Endian
theory assigns arbitrary probabilities to the values of X and
leads to the familiar conclusion that B should be preferred to
A provided the probability of X = 1 is less than the proba-
bility of X 2 f2; 3g: Nothing new so far, but now including C
into the consideration we observe that strategy C wins for
X 2 f1; 3g; so if A wins then C wins too, and there is a situ-
ation when C wins while A fails. Thus strategy C is not worse
than A, and it is strictly better if cave 3 sometimes hides the
goat. This provides a general ground to avoid A, and for a
similar reason to avoid all other strategies that do not switch
in some situation.
Experimentation with strategies A and C exercised simul-
taneously is possible by complex metaphysics. Before the
game starts, Connie’s personality splits into Jekyll-Connie to
play A and Hyde-Connie to play C, and the dissociated
players will not communicate. Monte hides the goat in one of
the caves, and then Jekyll-Connie and Hyde-Connie make
their first choices according to strategies A and C, respec-
tively. On the next move Monte reveals for Jekyll-Connie an
empty cave from caves 2 and 3, and he reveals for Hyde-
Connie an empty cave from caves 1 and 3. Based on their
initial choices and their private information received from
Monte, the dissociated players proceed with a final move
according to their strategies. No matter which rule Monte
uses to reveal the cave, Hyde-Connie will only lose when the
goat is in cave 2, but in this case Jekyll-Connie will lose, too,
as she does not switch to cave 2 according to strategy A.
Following a suggestion by Magister [9], we may call this way
of comparing strategies coupling by the initial position (i.e.,
location of goat). The coupling is analogous to simulta-
neously playing the same strategy in chess with, say, white
pieces against two players on two boards.
We stress that, according to the Big-Endian/Little-Endian
theory, discarding A in favor of B must be based on the
probabilities of the mutually exclusive events X = 1 and X 2
f2; 3g: In the Middle-Endian theory, the advantage of C over
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A follows from the fact that the event X = 1 is included in the
event X 2 f1; 3g; which is much stronger as the win of A
implies the win of C.
The dominance extends our horizons in understanding
the Mondee Gills Game. For instance, thinking of the supe-
riority of C over A, we do not need to interpret sometimes as
‘‘having positive probability’’. Think of a computer program
that schedules in a deterministic manner the location of the
goat, and suppose that on some Mondays the goat is hidden
behind cave 3. Then C will have a strict advantage over A
because of these very Mondays. In the following discussion
we shall only focus on application of the Middle-Endian
paradigm to the antagonistic variant of the game [5, 7].
The Zero-Sum Game
We shall consider the interaction of Monte and Connie as a
gameof strategy, as opposed to a game against nature.Monte
has freedom to choose the cave hiding the goat and to reveal
one of the empty caves when he has two options. Connie
chooses a cave, and when offered the second choice decides
between switch and notswitch. Connie wants to win the
goat. We shall no longer confine ourselves to the simplistic
scenario, ratherweallowarbitrary dependenceof the actions
on the course of the game. A fundamental model of inter-
action is the actors’ pure competition for goats, because this
instance reveals what Connie can achieve under the least
favorable circumstances. A technical term for this is a zero-
sum game, in which at the start of the game the goat belongs
to Monday TV and Monte wants to keep the goat for the
program.
Now we need to make the exposition more formal, so as
to avoid possible misinterpretations of Middle-Endianness.
Probabilities will be introduced into the scene as mixed
strategies of two active actors, Monte and Connie. Although
this article is mainly self-contained, we expect that the reader
is familiar with the basic concepts of strategy, minimax
solution, payoff, and common knowledge. For these and the
propositions used in the following text, we refer to the online
Course on Games [4].
Strategies and the Payoff Matrix
To introducenotation for the possible actions of actors and to
formalize the rules, it will be convenient to label the caves 1,
2, 3 in the left-to-right order. The game in extensive form has
four moves:
(i) Monte chooses a cave X out of 1, 2, 3 inwhich to hide the
goat. The choice is kept secret.
(ii) Connie picks a cave Y out of 1, 2, 3 and announces her
choice. Now both actors know Y, and they label the
caves distinct from Y Left and Right in the left-to-right
order.
(iii) If Y = X, so the choice by Connie fell on the cave with
thegoat,Monte choosescaveZ to reveal fromtheLeft and
Right caves. In the event of the mismatch Y = X, Monte
reveals the remaining cave Z (distinct from X and Y),
which is either Left or Right depending on X, Y.
(iv) Connie observes the revealed cave Z and makes a final
decision: she can choose between Notswitch or Switch
from Y to another unrevealed cave (so distinct from Y
and Z). Connie wins if the final choice yields X and loses
otherwise.
Monte’s action on step (iii), when he has the freedom of
choosing to reveal either the Right or Left cave, may depend
on Connie’s initial choice Y. Connie’s final action in (iv)
depends on both Y and Z. The rules of the game are part of
the common knowledge, which means that everybody
knows the rules, and knows that everybody knows, and
knows that everybody knows that everybody knows, etc.
To put the game in matrix form, we label the admissible
pure strategies of the actors. The pure strategies of Monte are
1L, 1R, 2L, 2R, 3L, 3R.
For instance, according to strategy 2L the goat is hidden in
cave X = 2, then if the outcome of (ii) is Y = 2, Monte will
reveal the Left cave (which is cave 1). Otherwise the second
move of Monte is forced and the ‘‘L’’ part of the code 2L is
irrelevant, in particular if Y = 1 he will reveal cave 3 (which
happens to be the Right cave), and if Y = 3 he will reveal
cave 1 (which happens to be the Left cave).
The pure strategies of Connie are
1SS, 1SN, 1NS, 1NN, 2SS, 2SN, 2NS, 2NN, 3SS,
3SN, 3NS, 3NN.
The digit 1, 2, or 3 is a value of Y, whereas SS, SN, NS, NN
encode how Connie’s second action depends on Y and
whether the Left or Right cave is revealed. For instance, 1NS
means that cave Y = 1 is initially chosen, then Connie plays
Notswitch if Monte reveals the Left cave; and she plays
Switch if Monte reveals the Right cave.
The game is played as if Monte and Connie have specified
their two-step pure strategies before the Mondee Gills show
starts. For this purpose they may ask friends for advice or
employ random devices such as spinning a roulette wheel or
rolling dice. After the choices are made the actors just follow
their plans. The choices could be communicated to a referee
who announces the then predetermined outcome of the
game. For example, if Connie and Monte choose profile
(2SN, 1R) the show proceeds as follows:
(i) Monte hides the goat in cave 1.
(ii) Connie picks cave 2, thus the actors label cave 1 as Left
and cave 3 as Right.
(iii) Monte observes a mismatch, hence he reveals the
remaining cave 3.
(iv) Connie observes revealed cave 3, which is Right, hence
she plays Notswitch - meaning that she stays with cave 2
(and loses).
In the zero-sum game the payoff of one actor is the neg-
ative of the payoff of the other: Connie wants to win the goat
whileMonte aims to avoid this.With regard to the satisfaction
of actors there are two distinguishable outcomes – so we
agree that Connie’s payoff is 1 if she wins the goat and 0
otherwise. All possible outcomes of the game are summa-
rized in matrix C showing Connie’s payoffs. The matrix has
appeared in Professor’s Book of Texts [5]:
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The mathematical structure of the game will not be changed
by certain transformations of the payoff matrix. For instance,
we might replace each 0 by -1. The latter would correspond
to the variant of the game in which both Connie and Monte
bring to the show one of their own goats, which are then
hidden by Monte in the same cave. Both goats go into the
possession of Connie, respectively Monte, depending on
whether Connie finds the cave with goats or not.
A mixed strategy for Connie is a row vector P of twelve
probabilities that are assigned to her pure strategies. Simi-
larly, a mixed strategy for Monte is a row vector Q with six
components. When strategy profile (P, Q) is played by the
actors, the expected payoff for Connie, equal to her winning
probability, is computed by matrix multiplication as
PCQT, where T denotes transposition. This way of com-
puting the winning probability presumes that the actors’
choices of pure strategies are independent random variables,
which may be simulated by their private randomization
devices. Intuitively, the statistical independence is a way to
say that cooperation of the actors in zero-sum games is
impossible, so that the actors cannot agree on any other kind
of joint distribution over the outcomes.
Suppose for a while that Monte is determined to play some
given strategy Q and that everybody including Connie knows
this. Thenher optimal behavior is P 0, a strategy of best response
(aka Bayesian strategy) against Q to maximize PCQT:
P 0 ¼ P 0ðQÞ; P 0CQT ¼ max
P
PCQT :
Exchanging the roles of the actors, we suppose that Connie is
determined to test a particular P and tells this to everybody,
so that Monte can react with a best response Q 0:
Q0 ¼ Q0ðPÞ; PCQ0T ¼ max
Q
PCQT :
A strategy profile (P*, Q*) is said to be a game solution (or







The common value is the uniquely determined (so the
same for all minimax profiles) value of the game, which we
denote V. The existence of the solution is the Minimax
Theorem (see [2], p. 197 for the history).
Dominance
The search for a solution is facilitated by a simple reduction
process based on the Middle-Endian idea of strategic domi-
nance. An actor’s strategy A is said to be weakly dominated by
this actor’s strategy B If anything the actor can achieve using
strategy A can be achieved at least as well using B, no matter
what the opponent does. That is to say, for every counter-
strategy S of the opponent, the outcome of the game with B
played against S is at least as favorable as the outcome of the
game with A played against S. If A and B are pure strategies of
Connie, the dominance simply means that if row A of the
payoff matrix has 1 in some column then row B also has 1 in
this very column.
The principle of eliminating dominated strategies takes
the form of a theorem, which says that reduction of the game
matrix by removal of weakly dominated pure strategies
(rowsor columns) does not affect the valueof the game. It is a
good exercise to derive the principle from the Minimax
Theorem. This enables us to reduce C by noticing that 1SS
dominates 2SN and 2NN:
and that 3SS dominates 2NS:
Similarly, all YNS, YNN, and YSN strategies are dominated
for Y = 1, 2, 3. After row elimination, the original game
matrix C is reduced to a smaller matrix:
Note that the strategies involving Nonswitch action are all
gone!
Continuing the reduction process, we observe that col-
umns XR and XL of the reduced matrix are identical for
X = 1, 2, 3, hence, using dominance, now from the per-
spective of Monte, the matrix can be further reduced to the
square matrix c:
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Mismatching the Caves and the Monte Crawl
Solution
The matrix c is the structure of payoffs in the Big-Endian
theory, concerned with the constant-action strategies. Each
actor has only three pure strategies. Monte and Connie
simultaneously choose caves; if the choices mismatch Con-
nie wins, otherwise there is no payoff.
The game has no solution in pure strategies (saddle
point), thus we turn to the actors’ mixed strategies p, q, which
we write as vectors of size three. One may guess and then
check that if Connie plays themixed strategywith probability
vector p* = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), then her probability of winning
is 2/3, no matter what Monte does. It is sufficient to check this
for three products p*cqT, where q is one of Monte’s pure
strategies, (1,0,0), (0,1,0), (0,0,1). Similarly, if Monte plays
the mixed strategy q* = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), then Connie’s win-
ning probability is 2/3 no matter what she does. Connie can
guaranteewinning chance 2/3, andMonte canguarantee that
the chance is not higher, therefore V = 2/3 is the minimax









pcqT ¼ pcqT ¼ 2=3:
Instead of guessing the minimax probability vectors p*
and q* one could use various computational techniques
found inChapter 3 ofCourse onGames [4].Here,wemention
one insightful transformation that should convince the
reader that the solution is correct. Subtracting from c the
constantmatrixwith all entries equal to 1 reduces to the game
with diagonal matrix
This corresponds to the variant of the game in which Connie
comes to the show with her goat and risks losing the pet to
Monte in the case of match, when her original guess falls on
the cave hiding the goat. A similar 2 9 2 matrix is the familiar
gameofmatchingpennies,withMontewinning in theeventof
match (the Quickygnosis article ‘‘Matching Pennies’’ is a good
reference).
Going back to the original matrix C, we conclude that
V = 2/3 is the value of the game, and that the profile
P ¼ 1
3
; 0; 0; 0;
1
3
; 0; 0; 0;
1
3














is a solution to the game. The subscript of Q1;1;1 will be
explained soon. According to this solution, Monte plays the
Monte Crawl strategy: he hides the goat uniformly at random,
and he always reveals the Left cave when there is freedom for
the secondaction. Connie selects cave Y uniformly at random
and always plays Switch.
A feature of this solution is that the preference of Monte to
the Left cave sometimes gives strong confidence to Connie’s
decision. When Monte reveals the Right cave, he signals that
the Left could not beopened, so Connie learns the locationof
the goat and her Switch action bears no risk.
All Minimax Solutions
The reader has certainly noticed that strategy Q1;1;1 disagrees
with the Little-Endian postulate of Monte’s fair-coin-flipping
in the event of match, X = Y. Monte’s behavior at random

































; Monte hides the goat uniformly at ran-
dom, and for the second choice between Left and Right if
there is freedom a fair coin is flipped. This strategy is also
minimax. Furthermore, instead of crawling to the Left cave
Monte could be hauled to the Right cave, when there is a
choice option.
What are all the minimax strategies of either actor? One
way to answer this question is to trace back what was lost in
dominated strategy elimination. By column elimination we
may delete either of the two pure strategies XL, XR for each
X = 1, 2, 3. This yields eight minimax solutions Q0;0;0;
Q0;0;1; . . .; Q

1;1;1; where in position X = 1, 2, 3 of the index
we write 0 if XL is never used, and we write 1 if XR is never
used. Each of these solutions is a deterministic behavior –
either crawling or hauling – depending on the cave by which
the match has occurred; these can be considered as mixed-
action strategies of Monte, as opposed to his constant-action
strategies of always-crawling or always-hauling.
Mixtures of these minimax strategies are again minimax,





















where 0 B kX B 1. The parameter kX has a transparent
interpretation: this is the conditional probability that Monte
will reveal the Left cave when the goat is hidden behind X
and a match Y = X occurs.
The subclass of Monte’s strategies with the second action
independent of the first given X = Y consists of strategies
with equal probabilities k1 = k2 = k3. This mode of Monte’s
behavior appears as Version Five in Mondee Book [17]. More
general strategies Qk1;k2;k3 , were also considered in the
extended Little-Endian framework [21].
We need to check further whether some minimax strate-
gies for Connie were lost in the course of row elimination.
This verification is necessary because the deleted dominated
strategies YNN, YNS, and YSN are only weakly dominated,
meaning that in some situations they perform equally well as
the strategies Y0SS that dominate them. Examples of games
can be given showing that weakly dominated strategies may
be minimax (see Course on Games, Section 2.6, Exercise 9).
Recall that a best response is a strategy optimal for an actor
knowing which particular strategy the opponent will use.
Every minimax strategy P is necessarily a best response to
every minimax strategy for Monte, yielding expected payoff
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equal to the value PCQTk1;k2;k3 = 2/3. Suppose for the time
being that minimax strategy P assigns nonzero probability
p [ 0 to the pure strategy 2SN, and let P 0 be a strategy
obtained from P by removing the 2SN-component but add-























which means that P 0 strictly improves P in combat against






: But this is in contradiction with
the assumed minimax property of P, and thus 2SN cannot
have positive probability in P. In the same way it is shown
that 2NN does not enter P, and by symmetry among the
caves we conclude that none of the dominated strategies
enters P. Thus nothing was lost by the row elimination.






we just used is that this strategy
givesnonzeroprobability to eachof the sixpure strategies for
Monte. A mixed strategy Q may be called fully supported if
every pure strategy has a positive probability in Q. In par-
ticular, Qk1;k2;k3 , is fully supported if and only if kX is distinct
from 0 and 1 for X = 1, 2, 3. A best response to a fully sup-
ported strategy cannot be weakly dominated, hence
minimaxity of some fully supported strategy of Monte pre-
cludes minimaxity of every weakly dominated strategy for
Connie.
To compare, let us examine the Monte Crawl strategy
Q1;1;1, which always reveals the Left cave when there is a
match. Thepure strategy 1NS is a best response to Q1,1,1, with
the winning chance 2/3, as for any other minimax strategy
of Connie. If Connie were ensured that Monte will play Q1;1;1
then shemay, in principle, choose 1NS.However, 1NS versus
Q1;1;1 would be an unstable profile, since Monte will then








We summarize our analysis of the zero-sum game in the
following theorem:
TH E O R E M The strategy P*, which is the uniform mixture
of 1SS, 2SS, 3SS, is the unique minimax strategy for Connie.
Every strategy Qk1;k2;k3 with 0 B kX B 1, (X = 1, 2, 3) is a
minimax strategy for Monte. The value of the game is V =
2/3.
We see that in the setting of zero-sum games any rational
behavior of Monte keeps Connie away from employing
strategies with Notswitch action. Professor [5] and Magister
[7] already knew that V = 2/3 and that throwing symmetric
three-sided dice by each of the actors is involved in the
solution of the MGG. Our contribution is that the Holy Grail
result appears as the first application of the Middle-Endian
doctrine of dominance.
The potential of the approach has been further explored
by the author [11, 12, 13, 14]. In particular, the dominance
implies that it is impossible to attribute probabilities to the
variables outside of Connie’s control in such a way that
some strategy utilizing notswitching action will give
(strictly) higher winning probability than every always-
switching strategy.
Afterword
The great mathematical minds of the past were not immune
to the fallacies of symmetry. The History of the Doctrine of
Chances (see [20], p. 48) tells us of Leibniz, who argued that
since both 12=6+6 and 11=5+6 can be achieved in only one
way, with two dice it is as feasible to throw a total 12 points as
to throw a total 11. The two-child paradox and the two-
envelopes paradox (consult Quickygnosis) are also of the
kind where symmetry is confusing. Most of these ‘‘para-
doxes’’ are resolved by adequately setting up the sample
spaces and events.
The mystery of switch seems to go beyond just that, and
can be only loosely compared with throwing dice, where the
uniform distribution is objectively justified by the physical
structure of the artifact. Human behavior is a more complex
matter, and the assumption of uniform distribution and
randomness at all (in the objective, frequentist sense) needs
justification, especially when it comes to interaction. Given
the model that the actors only care about whether the goat is
found or not, the rationality incorporated in the idea of
minimax indeed gives a justification for the uniform ran-
domizations both for hiding the goat and the first guess, but it
offers no ground for assuming anything about Monte’s
behavior when he can choose between two empty caves.
Moreover, if for some reasonMonte exploits a biased random
device to hide the goat, Connie still has an optimal always-
switching counter-strategy whose performance does not
depend on how Monte reveals one of two empty caves.
The world is wrong about the Mondee Gills Game, some
people say. Something certainly goes wrong when Laiemen
first do not believe that the odds are unequal, then hasten to
explain how stupid one is not to see this. What makes the
author sceptical about many such explanations is the amaz-
ing story about Paul Erd}os [16], where in the chapter ‘‘Getting
the Goat’’ we read:
Va´zsonyi wrote out a ‘‘decision tree,’’ not unlike the table of
possible outcomes that vos Savant had written out, but this
did not convince him. ‘‘It was hopeless,’’ Va´zsonyi said. ‘‘I
told this to Erd}os and walked away. An hour later he came
back to me really irritated. ‘You are not telling me why to
switch,’ he said. ‘What is the matter with you?’ I said I was
sorry, but that I didn’t really know why and that only the
decision tree analysis convinced me. He got even more
upset.’’ Va´zsonyi had seen this reaction before ½   but he
hardly expected it from the most prolific mathematician of
the twentieth century.
This sounds unbelievable, but his why and later pages of the
memoirs suggest that themajor concernof Erd}oswas the lack
of The Book proof. Using the dominance we do not need any
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probability assumptions in order to discard notswitching, so
we hope with this argument we are some steps closer to what
Erd}os might have wanted to see.
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